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Introduction
Digital signatures are widely deployed around the world and have the backing of significant international legislation to support their use in electronic environment. In this research, we are interested in exploring efficient identity-based proxy ring signature schemes.
Identity-based cryptography. Public-key cryptography has many different applications, but in its basic form, it requires extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use. In order to provide more flexible management of public keys the notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [1] . The main feature of identity-based cryptosystems is to remove the requirement of certification of the public keys. The public key of each party is obtained from its public identity, such as an email address, which can uniquely identify the party. Since the introduction of the notion in [1] , various identity based schemes ( [2] [3] [4] ) have been proposed.
Identity-based cryptography has attracted a lot of interest since the elliptic curve pairings are shown to provide an elegant way for implementing identity-based encryption schemes. In the past ten years, the majority of identity-based cryptosystems proposed have relied on pairings. While extensive research has led to vast improvements in implementation of pairings, their computational cost is still higher than that of traditional public key algorithms which use the exponentiation operation in various groups. Moreover, pairing-based cryptosystems rely on newer and less analyzed computational assumptions in their security analysis compared to traditional schemes that are based on classical assumptions like the widely studied RSA assumption. There has been a proliferation of pairing-based assumptions whose difficulty is not widely understood and whose connection to established assumptions, and to each other, remains unknown [5] . Therefore, when designing new identity-based cryptographic primitives, it is desirable to diversify the computational assumptions and to use widely accepted assumptions where possible.
Proxy ring signatures. The notion of proxy signatures was introduced by Mambo et al. [6] in 1996. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates her signing right for signing messages to a proxy signer. This kind of signature supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid the dependency to a single server. Since the introduction of the notion of proxy signatures, several variants of proxy signatures such as proxy signatures from RSA and integer factorization problem ( [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ), identitybased proxy signature schemes based on bilinear pairings ( [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] ), designated-verifier proxy signatures ( [20] [21] [22] ), short proxy signature [23] , proxy verifiably encrypted signatures [24] , proxy signature schemes without random oracles [25] , identity-based multi-proxy signatures [26] , proxy ring signatures ( [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] ) and identitybased proxy ring signatures from bilinear pairings ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) have been proposed.
In a proxy ring signature scheme, an original signer delegates her signing right for signing messages to a group of proxy signers with different public keys, called the proxy agent, such that they can generate proxy ring signatures on behalf of the original signer while he could be anonymous. This type of signature not only supports ensuring service availability for the customers in distributed networks to avoid the dependency to a single server but also supports preserving privacy of proxy signers. As mentioned in ( [27] [28] [29] ), this primitive can be used when the requirement of proxy signer's privacy protection is necessary. For example, it is assumed that a parliament member would like to reveal an important news on behalf of the cabinet, while he wants to be anonymous. The other practical motivation for this primitive is electronic voting protocols, where just eligible voters anonymously can cast their ballots after authenticating themselves. The voting authority (an original signer) in the voting protocol authenticates eligible voters and issues certificates (generates valid delegations) for them. Voters (proxy signers) anonymously cast their ballots (generates proxy ring signatures). On the one hand, employing identity-based proxy signatures violates the most important property of voting protocols, voter privacy. Additionally, employing blind signatures in voting protocols enables the malicious voting authority to cast its ballot instead of abstained voters, and so violates accuracy of the election. Proxy ring signatures incorporate three requirements (privacy of voters, authentication and accuracy) at the same time. We should highlight that some access control mechanisms are necessary in the voting protocol to provide uniqueness property. Indeed, this primitive is a solution to the problem of electronic voting protocols based on blind signatures in which a malicious voting authority can vote instead of abstained voters.
However, one still needs to verify public keys of proxy signers and the original signer in addition to verifying the validity of a proxy ring signature. Therefore, for the first time, Cheng et al. proposed an identity-based proxy ring signature [35] to facilitate public key certificate management of these types of signatures by merely employing signer's identities in place of the public keys and their certificates. Subsequently, there have been some follow-up works for identity-based proxy ring signatures ( [32] [33] [34] [36] [37] [38] [39] ), but unfortunately, none of them supports provable security. In 2014, Asaar et al. [40] presented the first formal definition and security model for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, and also proposed the first provably secure identitybased proxy ring signature scheme, and showed that it is secure under RSA assumption in the random oracle model. In addition, previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes proposed in ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) are vulnerable to the proxy key exposure attack [41] presented by Schuldt et al. in 2008 . In fact, in previous schemes, if temporal secret keys of proxy signers are leaked, long term secret keys of proxy signers will be compromised.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we present the first short identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from RSA. The proposed scheme is proved secure under the RSA assumption, a widely accepted assumption, in the random oracle model. The advantages of the proposed scheme are three-fold. First, it is the shortest identity-based proxy ring signature scheme without bilinear pairings. Second, it has a proper advantage in security reduction since reduction of the proposed scheme is independent of the number of members in a proxy ring. Third, it is as efficient as or more efficient than existing identity-based proxy ring signature schemes. Furthermore, the proxy key exposure attack [41] cannot be applied to our scheme since the paradigm used in designing this primitive is sequential aggregation of an identity-based signature and an identity-based ring signature scheme.
One may think that it is possible to build short identity-based proxy ring signature schemes without bilinear pairings from the idea presented in [42] . We should emphasize that if we use this idea in designing this primitive, the result is no longer identity-based since public keys according this idea are not just identities of signers, and in this primitive, each proxy signer needs to interact before signature generation to attain proxy signers' public keys and cannot easily use identities of other proxy signers to generate an identity-based proxy ring signature.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents notations and RSA complexity assumption employed as the signature foundation. The security model of identity-based proxy ring signature including outline of the identity-based proxy signature scheme and its security properties are given in Section 2. The proposed scheme and its formal security proofs are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the comparison and discussion. Conclusion and future work are given in Section 5.
Background
In this section, first we give notations used throughout the paper and review the RSA assumption, and then we present the outline and security definitions for the identity-based proxy ring signature schemes [40] .
Notations
If X is a set, then x $ ← X denotes the operation of assigning to x an element of X chosen uniformly at random. If x 1 , x 2 , ... are objects then x 1 ||x 2 ||... denotes an encoding of them as strings from which the constituent objects are effectively recoverable. Let ⊥ be an empty string, |x| be the bit length of x, and θ ← C(x 1 , ...) stands for the operation of assigning the output of the algorithm C on inputs x 1 , ... to θ. Let A be an algorithm which has access to H, K, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign oracles of a signature scheme, and can win a game in which a security property of the scheme is violated by A. If algorithm A is (t, q h , q k , q e , q d , q prs , )-bounded, we mean that the algorithm A which runs in time at most t, makes at most q h queries to random oracle H, q k queries to random oracle K, q e queries to KeyExtract oracle, q d queries to DelegationGen and q prs queries to ProxyRingSign oracle can win the game with probability at least .
The RSA assumption
An RSA key generator KG rsa is an algorithm that generates triplets (N, e, d) such that N is the product of two large primes p and q and ed = 1 mod ϕ(N ), where ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The advantage of an algorithm B in breaking the one-wayness of RSA related to KG rsa is defined as
We say that B, (t , )-breaks the one-wayness of RSA with respect to KG rsa if it runs in time at most t and has advantage Adv ow−rsa KGrsa (B) ≥ . We say that the RSA function associated to KG rsa is (t , )-one-way if there is no algorithm B that can (t , )-break it.
Outline of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes
Let identity of each original signer be ID 0 , and identity set of proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and ID, respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol instance, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers. An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, KeyExtract, DelegationGen, DelegationVer, ProxyRingSign and ProxyRingVer as follows [40] .
-Setup: This algorithm takes as input the system security parameter l and outputs system's parameters P ara and the system's master key (msk, mpk), i.e. (P ara, (msk, mpk)) ← P araGen(l).
-KeyExtract: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, master public key mpk, master secret key msk, and an identity ID u . It outputs the corresponding secret key x u for the identity ID u , i.e. x u ← KeyExtract(P ara, mpk, msk, ID u ).
-DelegationGen: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, an identity ID o and an identity set ID, including at least two identities, for an original signer and a proxy agent, respectively. It also takes as input the secret key x o of the original signer with identity ID o and a message space descriptor w ⊆ {0, 1} * for which the original signer with identity ID o delegates its signing right to a proxy agent with identity set ID, then, it outputs a delegation σ o ← DelegationGen(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, w, x o ).
-DelegationVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, an original signer's identity ID o , the proxy signers' identity set ID, a message space descriptor w and a delegation σ o , then, it outputs 1 if σ o is a valid delegation and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← DelegationV er(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, w, σ o ).
-ProxyRingSign: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the identity set ID of proxy signers including at least two identities, a valid delegation σ o for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers such that ID ⊆ ID and the delegation indicates that an original signer with identity ID o delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID, a proxy signer's secret key x j corresponding to an identity ID j $ ← ID ⊆ ID and a message m ∈ w, then, it outputs the identity-based proxy ring signature θ on behalf of the original signer with identity ID o , i.e. θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, ID, (m, w, σ o ), x j ).
-ProxyRingVer: This algorithm takes as input the system's parameter P ara, an original signer's identity ID o , the proxy signers' identity sets ID and ID, a message space descriptor w, a signed message m and a proxy ring signature θ, then, it outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy ring signature of the message m which means that it satisfies the verification equation, m ∈ w and ID ⊆ ID and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e. {0, 1} ← P roxyRingV er(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, ID, w, m, θ).
Security models of identity-based proxy ring signature schemes
An identity-based proxy ring signature must satisfy two independent notions of security: unforgeability and privacy of proxy signer' identity. To achieve existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message (chosen warrant: chosen message space descriptor and identity set of proxy signers) and chosen identity attack for identity-based proxy ring signature schemes, three types of potential adversaries as mentioned in [27] are considered as follows.
-Type I: This type adversary A I only has identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers. -Type II: This type adversary A II has secret keys of some (one/all) proxy signers in a proxy group in addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers. -Type III: This type adversary A III has the secret key of the original signer in addition to identities of the original signer and proxy signers, and aims to forge a valid identity-based proxy ring signature w.r.t. identities of the original signer and proxy signers.
Clearly, if an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is secure against Type II (or Type III) adversaries then it is also secure against Type I adversary. Unforgeability against Type I, Type II and Type III adversaries (A I , A II and A III ) is formalized using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup:
The challenger C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system's parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
A issues a polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles adaptively:
KeyExtract queries:
A can ask for the secret key corresponding to each identity ID u , then C returns the private key x u to the adversary with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
3. DelegationGen queries: Adversary A can request a delegation under the identity ID o of an original signer on a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of its choice for which the original signer with identity ID o delegates its signing right on w to a proxy agent with identity set ID. In response, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key x o of the original signer, and returns
4. ProxyRingSign queries: Adversary A can request the proxy ring signature of m w.r.t. ID to C. In addition, adversary A provides a delegation σ o of an original signer with identity ID o for a message space descriptor w and an identity set ID of proxy signers. This delegation was obtained from DelegationGen algorithm or was generated by adversary A. Algorithm C checks that σ o is a valid delegation in which the original signer with identity ID o delegates its signing right for the message space descriptor w to the proxy agent with identity set ID; that ID ⊆ ID; and that m ∈ w. If any of these fails to hold, returns ⊥. Otherwise, C runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key x j corresponding to one of the proxy signers with identity ID j such that ID j $ ← ID. Next, C runs ProxyRingSign algorithm θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, ID, (m, w, σ o ), x j ) to generate the proxy ring signature θ and returns it to the adversary A. Definition 1. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game. Definition 2. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q d , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q d , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
For A = A III : -E 0 : Each identity in ID * has not been requested as one of the KeyExtract queries which means that A III does not have the secret keys corresponding to identities in ID * . -E 1 :m * has not been requested as one of the ProxyRingSign queries under identity set ID * ⊆ ID * .
The formal definition of existential unforgeability against adversary A III [40] is expressed in Definition 3.
Definition 3. An identity-based proxy ring signature is (t, q h , q e , q prs , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (warrant) and chosen identity attack if there is no (t, q h , q e , q prs , )-bounded adversary A which wins the aforementioned game.
Privacy of proxy signer's identity (PPSI) in an identity-based proxy ring signature means that it should be infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguisher D to tell which proxy signer in a proxy group generates θ on a message m. To have a formal definition for this property consider the following game between a challenger C and a distinguisher D.
1. Setup: The challenger C runs the P araGen algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system's parameter para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to D.
The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the forgery game.
2. the distinguisher D chooses two honest identities ID 1 and ID 2 (D never make KeyExtract query for these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an identity ID o and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID = {ID 0 , ID 1 } ⊆ ID, respectively.
In response, C chooses j $ ← {0, 1}, runs KeyExtract for ID o and ID j to obtain their corresponding secret keys, and runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under the identity ID o to obtain σ o and returns
3. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j and wins the game if j = j.
The formal definition for privacy of proxy signer's identity [40] is given in definition 4. If the probability is equal to 1 2 , the scheme satisfies privacy of the proxy signer's identity perfectly.
Definition 4. (Privacy of the proxy signer's identity). An identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is
(t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , + 1 2 )-PPSI-secure if there is no (t, q h , q e , q d , q prs , +
Our identity-based proxy ring signature scheme
In this section, we present an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme using sequential aggregation of GQ identity-based signature [43] and the identity-based ring signature scheme [44] . Our scheme generates an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme in a way that a delegation is original signer's GQ identity-based signature on a message space descriptor and proxy signers' identities concatenated with 11, and a proxy ring signature is sequential aggregation of a delegation and a ring signature generated by one of the proxy signers on a message, belonged to the message space descriptor concatenated with 11. Indeed, concatenation with 11 prevents trivial attacks as suggested by Boldyreva et al. [45] .
Details of identity-based proxy ring signature scheme
In this section, we present the details of our scheme. When describing the signature scheme, let identity of each original signer be ID o , and identity set of each proxy agent and each subset of that be ID and ID, respectively. The indices used in the signature description have no global meaning outside this protocol instance which means that there is no certified relationship between indices and identities, and just serve as local pointers for original and proxy signers.
It is assumed that n ≥ 2 and z ≥ 2 are the number of identities for proxy signers in the proxy agent and the size of each subset ID of ID, respectively. Our scheme consists of Setup, KeyExtract, DelegationGen, DelegationVer, ProxyRingSign and ProxyRingVer algorithms as described below.
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l 0 , l 1 and l N ∈ N, and let
* → {0, 1} l1 and H : {0, 1} * → Z * N be random oracles. Let KG rsa be a RSA key pair generator that outputs triplets (N, e, d) such that ϕ(N ) > 2 l N and with prime encryption exponents e of length strictly greater than l 0 and l 1 bits. The key distribution center runs KG rsa to generate RSA parameters (N, e, d). It publishes mpk = (N, e) as the master public key, and keeps the master secret key msk = d secret. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {K 0 , K 1 , H} and mpk.
2. KeyExtract: On input master secret key msk = d and the user identity ID u , the key distribution center computes x u = H(ID u ) d mod N , and sends the user secret key x u over a secure and authenticated channel to the user with identity ID u .
3. DelegationGen: Let w be a message space descriptor for which an original signer with identity ID o would like to delegate her signing right to a group of proxy signers with an identity set ID, the delegation is 
, and accepts the signature if and only if c z = c 0 , where c o = K 0 (R o ||w||ID||11).
Analysis of the scheme
In this section, we verify the correctness, and prove the privacy of the proxy signer's identity and existential unforgeability of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model (see [46] for the background). In order to prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against adversaries of types II and III (as defined in Section 2.4).
To prove unforgeability of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary A ζII+(1−ζ)III , ζ ∈ {0, 1}, (the parameter ζ makes difference between adversaries A II and A III ) we show that there is a solver (algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the RSA problem with a non-negligible probability. To do this, we show that there exists a simulator C A ζII+(1−ζ)III that can simulate the signature scheme without knowing the secret key(s) of the honest signer(s), and runs the adversary A ζII+(1−ζ)III as its sub-routine. In this regard, we compute the run-time and a lower-bound for the success probability of this simulator in terms of the run-time and success probability of the adversary and the number of queries to the oracles. Then, B uses the oracle replay technique [47] to solve an instance (N, e, y) of the RSA problem, using a useful pair that C A ζII+(1−ζ)III outputs when the random string used in both simulations are the same. In this case, we compute a lower bound for the probability of producing such a useful pair and solving the RSA instance as the main body of the solver algorithm B.
To start let us verify the correctness of the proposed scheme, and we use the fact that u is module z. Note that, all computations are done modulo N , but we omit this for simplicity.
Also, in what follows we will be needing the following Splitting lemma.
then the following statements hold:
Theorem 1. The proposed scheme is (t, q H , q K0 , q E , q d , )-secure against an adversary A II if the RSA function associated to Kg rsa is (t , )-one-way, and
, t e is the time of an exponentiation in Z * N , and q H , q K0 , q E and q d are the number of queries to the oracles H, K 0 , KeyExtract and DelegationGen, respectively. Proof. Given the adversary A II , we construct another algorithm B which runs C A II on inputs (N, e, y = γ e mod N ). The B's goal is to output γ = y 1 e mod N . Algorithm C A II runs A II , which breaks existential unforgeability of the proposal, on inputs mpk = (N, e) and answers A II 's oracle queries. Since A II has secret keys of all proxy signers, it can generate valid proxy ring signatures if and only if it forges a valid delegation. It is assumed that algorithm C A II maintains initially empty associative arrays T [.] and T K0 [.] , and answers A II 's oracle queries as follows.
l0 , and returns Finally, it is assumed that A II outputs a valid forgery in the form of (R o , s o , c o ) on a message m and a warrant w under original signer's identity ID o with probability at least in time bound t provided that C A II does not abort in signature simulation. First, we compute the lower-bound of the probability that C A II does not abort at answering to queries of A II , we need to compute η = Pr [ The algorithm C A II aborts at answering to a KeyExtract query when bad KE is set to true which means that b = 1 for a given identity. The probability of this event is 1 − β, so the probability that C A II does not abort for one KeyExtract query is β. Since A II makes at most q E KeyExtract queries, the probability that C A II does not abort as a result of q E KeyExtract queries is at least β q E . [.] and the number of R o , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one DelegationGen query is at most (q d + q K0 )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for
In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A II previously used the same randomness R o , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one DelegationGen simulation. Since there are at most q d DelegationGen simulations, this probability is at most q d 2 −l N . Therefore, for q d DelegationGen queries, the probability of this event is at most q
Therefore, the probability that C A II does not halt in signature simulation is at least η ≥ β 
With substituting the value of β, we obtain β
If q E = 0, this value is 1 and (1− 1 q E +1 ) 1+q E is a monotonically increasing sequence for q E ≥ 1. Therefore, the lower bound of
Since K 0 is a random oracle, the probability of the event that c o = K 0 (R o ||w||ID||11)) is less than 2 −l0 , unless it is asked during the attack. Hence, in what follows it is likely that query (R o ||w||ID||11) has been asked during a successful attack. The lower bound of probability of producing a valid forgery after making query to K 0 oracle is 2 ≥ 1 − 2 −l0 . Then, B uses the oracle replay technique [47] to solve the RSA problem.
Algorithm B employs two copies of C A II , guesses a fixed index 1 ≤ κ ≤ (q K0 + q d ) and hopes that κ be the index of query (R o ||w||ID||11) to oracle K 0 for which A II forges a delegation, and the probability of a good guess by chance is (R o ||w||ID||11) from K 0 . We employ Splitting Lemma to compute the probability of B in returning a useful pair.
It is assumed that Γ denotes the set of successful executions of C A II , and its success probability of C A II in returning a useful output is taken over the space (X, Y ), where X is the set of random bits and random oracle responses that C A II takes up except for randomness related to the oracle K 0 , and Y is the set of random oracle responses to the oracle K By dividing the two aforementioned equations, we obtain (x
l0 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 0 , we have e > (c o −c o ) and therefore gcd(e, (c o −c o )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that ae
as the RSA inversion of y with probability . Algorithm B's run-time t is twice of A II 's run-time, t, plus the time required to respond to hash queries, q E KeyExtract and q d DelegationGen queries. To estimate the required time of signature simulation, it is assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in Z N takes t e time while all other operations take zero time. Since each random oracle H or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a delegation simulation takes 2 exponentiations, B's run-time is t ≤ 2(t + (q H + q E + 2q d )t e ). This completes the proof. Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is (t, q H , q K1 , q E , q prs , )-secure against an adversary A III if the RSA function associated to Kg rsa is (t , )-one-way, and
, t e is the time of an exponentiation in Z * N , and q H , q K0 , q K1 , q E and q prs are the number of queries to the oracles H, K 0 , K 1 , KeyExtract and P roxyRingSign, respectively.
Proof. Given the adversary A III , we construct another algorithm B which runs C A III on inputs (N, e, y = γ e mod N ). The B's goal is to output γ = y 1 e mod N . Algorithm C A III runs A III , which breaks existential unforgeability of the proposal, on inputs mpk = (N, e) and answers A III 's oracle queries. Since A III has the secret key of the original signer, it can simulate delegations by itself, and the oracle access to DelegationGen is not necessary. It is assumed that algorithm C A III maintains initially empty associative arrays T [.], T K0 [.] and T K1 [.] , and answers A III 's oracle queries as follows.
l0 , and returns 
] has already been defined, then C A III sets bad P S ← true and halts; otherwise, it sets Finally, it is assumed that A III outputs a valid forgery θ = (R o , r 0 ..., r z−1 , c 0 ) on a message m and the message space descriptor w under the original signer's identity ID o and the proxy signers' identity sets ID and ID with probability at least in time bound t provided that C A III does not abort in signature simulation. To lower-bound the probability that C A III does not abort at answering to queries of A III , we need to compute η = Pr[¬bad KE ] Pr[¬bad P S |¬bad KE ], where events bad KE and bad P S indicate that C A III aborts in signature simulation as a result of any of A III 's KeyExtract and ProxyRingSign queries, respectively. These probabilities are computed as follows.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 1.
Proof. Events ¬bad KE and ¬bad P S are independent, so Pr[¬bad P S |¬bad KE ] = Pr[¬bad P S ]. The value of Pr[¬bad P S ] is the probability that C A III does not abort as a result of ProxyRingSign queries. The algorithm C A III aborts at answering to a ProxyRingSign query if bad P S is set to true which means that there is a conflict in table T K1 [.] for these kinds of queries. The probability of finding a conflict in T K1 [.] for one ProxyRingSign query equals the probability that (
co ||ID|| ID||ID u ||w||m||11) generated in ProxyRingSign simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle K 1 . Since there are at most q K1 + q prs entries in the table T K1 [.] for these kinds of queries and the number of R u , uniformly distributed in Z N , is 2 l N , the probability of this event for one ProxyRingSign is at most (q prs + q K1 )2 −l N . Hence, the probability of this event for q prs queries is at most q prs (q prs + q K1 )2 −l N . In addition, this probability includes the probability that C A III previously used the same randomness R u , uniformly distributed in Z N , in one ProxyRingSign simulation. Since there are at most q prs Prox-yRingSign simulations, this probability is at most q prs 2 −l N . Therefore, for q prs ProxyRingSign queries the probability of this event is at most q
Since the forgery is valid, we have
, and c z = c 0 , and also A III has not asked the message m from ProxyRingSign algorithm under proxy signer's identity set ID ⊆ ID and it contains z uncorrupted identities with probability at least (1 − β) z . Algorithm C A III performs additional random oracle queries H(ID u ) for identities in the forgery to find T [ID u ] = (b, x u , X u ) for them, and returns (R o , r 0 ..., r z−1 , c 0 , {x u } 0≤u≤z−1 , x o , m, w). As a result, the probability of returning a useful output is at least (1−β)
With substituting the value of β, we have β
Since K 1 is a random oracle, the probability of the event
for 0 ≤ u ≤ z − 1 is less than z2 −l1 , unless they are asked during the attack. Hence, it is likely that
are asked during a successful attack. The lower bound of probability of producing a useful output after making queries to K 1 oracle is
. It is assumed that Υ denotes the set of successful executions of C A III , and its success probability of C A II in returning a useful output after making query to K 1 is taken over the space (X, Y ), where X is the set of random bits and random oracle responses that C A III takes up except for the randomness related to the oracle K 1 , and Y is the set of random oracle responses to the oracle K 1 . Hence, we have Pr[(X, Y ) ∈ Υ ] = 2 . There is at least one index ν ∈ (0, ..., z −1) such that the query
was made to the oracle K 1 before query 
and we have Pr
. Therefore, with probability at least , where π =
, which means that B obtains a useful pair (R o , r 0 ..., r z−1 , c 0 , {x u } 0≤u≤z−1 , x o , m, w) and (R o , r 0 ..., r z−1 , c 0 , {x u } 0≤u≤z−1 , x o , m, w). Since the query
where c ν = c ν and R ν = r e ν . With rearranging the above equation, we obtain (x
Since c ν = c ν ∈ {0, 1} l1 and e is a prime of length strictly greater than l 1 , we have e > (c ν − c ν ) and therefore gcd(e, (c ν − c ν )) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, one can find a, b ∈ Z such that
as the RSA inversion of y with probability .
Algorithm B's run-time t is twice of A III 's run-time, t, plus the time required to respond to hash queries, q E KeyExtract and q prs ProxyRingSign queries. To estimate the required time of signature simulation, it is assumed that a (multi-) exponentiation in Z N takes t e time, while all other operations take zero time. Since each random oracle H or KeyExtract query takes at most one exponentiation, a ProxyRingSign simulation takes (2z + 1) exponentiations, B's run-time is t ≤ 2(t + (q H + q E + (2z + 1)q prs )t e ). This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. The identity-based proxy ring signature scheme is (t, q H , q K0 , q K1 , q e , q d , q prs , 1 2 )-PPSI-secure since the probability of D in guessing the identity of the proxy signer for a given signature θ,
Proof. The distinguisher D issues a polynomially bounded number of random oracle, KeyExtract, DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign queries adaptively as explained in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2.
Then, D chooses two honest identities ID 0 and ID 1 for proxy ring (D never make KeyExtract query for these two identities), and makes a DelegationGen and ProxyRingSign query on (w, ID) under an identity ID o and on the message m ∈ w under the identity set ID = {ID 0 , ID 1 } ⊆ ID, respectively. In response, C chooses j $ ← {0, 1}, runs DelegationGen on (w, ID) under an identity ID o to obtain σ o and returns θ ← P roxyRingSign(P ara, mpk, ID o , ID, ID, (w, m, σ o ), x j ) to D. Finally, the distinguisher D outputs j = j with probability 1 2 . To show the value of this probability, we compute the probability that ID j generates valid values for R 0 and R 1 of θ which are pairwise different. The probability of choosing different values for R 0 and R 1 is
Then, θ is computed from random numbers r u for u = j in R u and r employed in R j . The probability of generation of the proxy ring signature θ = (R o , r 0 , r 1 , c 0 ) is independent from the identity of the real signer ID j , then, this probability is the same for two members in the set of proxy signers. Therefore, the probability of D in guessing the real signer is 3.3 On achieving identity-based proxy ring signatures without bilinear pairings in the standard model
Although our scheme is the first short identity-based proxy ring signature which is efficient (due to the not relying on bilinear pairings), it is proved secure in the random oracle model. In fact, an identity-based proxy ring signature without bilinear pairings is sequential aggregation of an identity-based standard signature without bilinear pairings (a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of an original signer) and a non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key of one of the proxy signers in the proxy ring. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, Fiat-Shamir heuristic is used to implement a non-interactive proof of knowledge, and therefore its security relies on the randomness of the underlying hash function. So far there is no scheme for identity-based proxy ring signatures without bilinear pairings with provable security in the standard model, and hence this leads to the difficulty of achieving identity-based proxy ring signatures without bilinear pairings in the standard model, which is an interesting future reserach problem.
Comparison
The comparison for some provably secure (identity-based) proxy ring signature schemes is summarized in Table 1 . The comparison is in terms of DeleGen-Cost, DeleVer-Cost , PRSign-Cost and PRVer-Cost , dominating computational cost in delegation generation, delegation verification, proxy ring signature generation and proxy ring signature verification, respectively. In Table 1 , exp denotes exponentiation in Z * N . For the sake of comparison, it is assumed that other operations take zero time and z = n which means that ID = ID.
Since previous identity-based proxy ring signature schemes ( [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ) do not support provable security, they are not considered in comparison. As shown in Table 1 , our scheme compared to Asaar et al.'s provably secure proxy ring signature scheme [40] has a proper advantage in signature-size. In a nutshell, since l 1 |Z N | (for example, l 1 is about 160 bits, while |Z N | = 1024), the signature-size is improved by a factor |Z N | − l 1 . Asaar et al. [40] 2exp 2exp (2n + 1)exp (n + 2)exp (n + 2)Z * N On one hand, since the probability of solving the RSA problem as shown in Theorem 4 is nearly 2 (q K 1 +qprs) 2 , and so is independent of the number of proxy signers.
On the other hand, in [40] , the probability of solving the RSA problem is ≥ . With approximately estimation, the probability is 2 (q K 1 +qprs) z , and so it is a function of the number of proxy signers in a proxy ring, z. Therefore, the security reduction is improved. Furthermore, since the total number of exponentiations in proxy ring signature generation and verification for the two schemes are the same, the new scheme is as efficient as the old one.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a provably secure proxy ring signature scheme from RSA assumption. This scheme is the first short one for this type of signature from RSA. In addition, the security reduction of the proposal has been improved compared to the ones from RSA since it is independent of the number of proxy signers in the proxy ring. We should highlight that the proposed scheme has a proper advantage in efficiency due to the avoiding pairing computations since the cost of each pairing computation is roughly that of 2.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, the proxy key exposure attack is not applicable to our scheme since it is generated based on sequential aggregation paradigm.
Although our scheme is the first short identity-based proxy ring signature scheme which is efficient (due to the not relying on bilinear pairings), it is proved secure in the random oracle model. According to Section 4, there is no identity-based proxy ring signature scheme without bilinear pairing with provable security in the standard model. As a result, presenting an identity-based proxy ring signature scheme from traditional assumptions such as RSA and discrete logarithm with provable security in the standard model is an open problem, and proposing a scheme with the aforementioned features will be considered as a future work.
